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The weakest part of the book is the chapter in which trial lawyer Adrian Brooks
speculates as to what might have happened in the trial of Constable Campbell for
manslaughter. To be sure, Brooks displays an impressive knowledge of legal strate-
gies and procedures. However, even such well-informed speculation is unsatisfying,
especially given that Stonebanks shows at length, in his treatment of the grand jury’s
decision not to indict, that legal proceedings can produce the most bizarre and outra-
geous results.
There are also some stylistic and editing concerns. Parts of the book are blemished
by considerable amounts of repetition. In a particularly jarring instance, Stonebanks
reuses one of the most dramatic passages in the book. In the opening paragraph of the
introduction, Stonebanks describes the party that searched for Goodwin and notes
that one of the guides was “a famous cougar hunter. But the prey this day was
human” (p. 1). In the opening of chapter 6, one reads again that the guide was “well
known as a cougar hunter on Vancouver Island. The prey this time, however, was
human” (p. 92).
Despite these drawbacks, Stonebanks’s work will be of interest to both scholars
and activists interested in organized labour and the working class, socialism and left-
ism, and the history of British Columbia. Above all, for those who remain inspired by
Goodwin’s charisma, experiences, and activism or who remain interested in the mys-
tery behind the events leading up to and following his murder, Fighting for Dignity is
essential reading.
David Goutor
University of Toronto
SUMMERHILL, William R. — Order against Progress: Government, Foreign Invest-
ment, and Railroads in Brazil, 1854–1913. Stanford, CA.: Stanford University
Press, 2003. Pp. xx, 297.
This book argues that no other technological innovation before 1914 had the impact
of the railroad on Brazil’s economy, decreasing transport costs as much as one order
of magnitude between 1860 and 1900. Brazil, like the United States, made extensive
use of shipping by water, but largely in the form of coastal shipping rather than river
transport. In judging the impact of railroads, William Summerhill therefore chooses
to compare railroad transport with pre-rail forms of overland transport.
Following in the steps of Robert Fogel, Albert Fishlow, John Coatsworth, and oth-
ers who have measured the economic impact of railroads elsewhere, Summerhill uses
a counterfactual approach to show how great were the “social savings” produced by
the railroads. That is, he establishes the savings that railroads provided by estimating
the costs that would have been incurred for moving the same amount of goods (and
passengers) by pre-rail means of overland transport — chiefly by muleback.
Railroads were the most important category of British investments in Brazil, and
“easily the most expensive” investment projects in the country in the nineteenth cen-
tury. The Brazilian government attracted foreign (largely British) investment, prima-
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rily by guaranteeing minimum profit rates; yet it required that the foreign (and soon,
national) companies share profits with the government above specified levels. Over
time, however, the national government became the largest owner of railroads (mea-
sured in track mileage), reaching 61 per cent in 1914. This occurred because the gov-
ernment often assumed ownership to meet the demands of politically powerful
planters, even if that meant operating at a loss. Also, as the Brazilian milreis depre-
ciated, government-guaranteed dividend payments in hard currency grew so expen-
sive that national authorities bought out some foreign lines, then leased them back to
private companies.
Chapter 4 sets out the method of measurement of savings in detail. Here the author
also makes explicit the assumptions required for his calculations. Among these are
constant returns to scale across the whole economy and the existence of perfect com-
petition, both of which are patently unrealistic. Therefore this “strong” (and unreal-
istic) assumption renders the numeric results “suggestive” rather than conclusive.
Summerhill also estimates upper and lower bounds of direct savings on freight pro-
duced by the railroads, establishing a band in which the savings most likely fell.
“Sensitivity tests” provide estimations of the price-elasticity of demand for transport
in 1913. That demand was relatively inelastic — that is, a unit change in fees charged
had a less than proportional effect on demand. The author estimates that the direct
social savings provided by the rail system as a whole equalled something between 5
and 15 per cent of gross domestic product in 1913 — a large amount. The savings for
Brazil were higher than for most countries at similar levels of development. Savings
resulted from rail passenger travel, too, but only in the range of 1.3 to 3.7 per cent of
GDP.
Summerhill devotes a chapter to testing claims made by the “dependency” school
that railroads, like most other foreign investments, had a net negative effect on the
Brazilian economy. Yet Summerhill contends that the railroad likely had strong pos-
itive effects on domestic industry, because the integration of economic space dra-
matically lowered the cost of transporting inputs to factories and final products to
national markets. Nor did rails lock Brazil into ever-greater export dependency. The
study offers estimates that the domestic economy grew even faster in the period
under review than the export economy. Exports’ share of GDP fell on average by 1.6
per cent annually for 1861–1914. Furthermore, users of railroads enjoyed economic
rents — the sum of resource savings and benefits redistributed to consumers of rail-
road services in the form of lower freight rates. This was most obviously the case
where the government bought out foreign lines and operated them at a loss. On the
“leakages” abroad to foreign investors, the author estimates the total outflow of
profits and payments for inputs and fuel amounted only to half of 1 per cent of GDP
in 1913, and he establishes that, on average, foreign railways did not have higher
profit rates than domestic ones. But the British-owned San [sic] Paulo Railway that
monopolized the coffee “funnel” line from the plateau to the port of Santos — like
the domestically owned Companhia Paulista — did so well that it renounced its
claim to profits guarantees so that it would not have to share “excess” revenues with
the government.
Another way in which consumers of railroad services benefited from government
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regulation was in the fall of the value of the milreis against the pound sterling, a con-
tinual if uneven process over the long term, in a system in which railroads’ rates in
milreis were held down by government regulation. Ultimately, the government per-
mitted a sliding scale of milreis to sterling, whereby companies could raise rates to
ensure continuing profitability. Since the Brazilian government only had to guaran-
tee a minimum competitive rate of return, as measured against alternative invest-
ments on the London capital market, regulation tended to capture most of the
benefits of rail transport and keep them in Brazil.
All these arguments tend to refute dependency theory, notes the author, as repre-
sented in the works of Bradford Burns, Peter Evans, Gunder Frank, and, in a more
limited way, Richard Graham. All in all, and contrary to dependency, “Brazilians,
rather than foreigners, reaped the vast bulk of the benefits that railroads created”
(p. 194). But railroads may have worsened the distribution of income within Brazil.
They may also have increased the concentration of rural property and lengthened the
life of Brazil’s slave regime. Yet Summerhill shows that national wage levels as a
share of GDP did not exhibit any downward trend from the latter nineteenth century
to 1913.
Some might think that the attention devoted to refuting the dependency school is
wasted energy, given the decline of dependency’s influence 20 years ago, but on
some issues dependency interpretations still have wide currency, and Summerhill
provides rigorous refutations of dependency claims. He furthermore makes his
assumptions explicit and acknowledges the weaknesses of his carefully ordered data
— practices that dependency writers have generally failed to follow.
Joseph L. Love
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
VAUGHN, Frederick — The Canadian Federalist Experience: From Defiant Monar-
chy to Reluctant Republic. Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2003. Pp. 225.
On se demande parfois ce que George Grant pourrait dire du Canada, aujourd’hui en
2005, s’il avait à réécrire son fameux Lament for a Nation. On en a probablement une
bonne idée dans ce beau livre de Frederick Vaughan. S’il s’agit d’un livre de théorie
politique et d’histoire politique, et non d’un pamphlet, il reste que l’argument de
l’auteur est fidèle à l’esprit de ce classique. La publication du livre de Vaughan con-
firme le regain de l’histoire des idées dans l’étude de la politique canadienne. Des
livres comme Getting It Wrong (Paul Romney), The Invisible Crown (David Smith),
Liberal, Conservative or Republican? (Janet Ajzenstat et Peter J. Smith) ont con-
tribué, ces dernières années, à nuancer les interprétations matérialistes de la genèse
du régime politique canadien. Ce livre de Vaughan s’inscrit résolument dans la veine
ouverte par cette constallation intellectuelle. The Canadian Federalist Experience
soulève des hypothèses audacieuses et sérieuses, que les chercheurs devront
sérieusement examiner dans les prochaines années.
